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IN THE SUPREME COORT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In Re: ROBERT B. HANSEN 
No. 15605 
Disciplinary Proceeding 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
POINT ONE 
********* 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING APPELLANT IS ENl'ITLED TO 
SPECIAL TREATMENT BECAUSE HE IS ATTORNEY GENERAL. 
While sustaining the findings of the Bar Commission 
that appellant committed multiple violations of the Code 
-of Professional Conduct, the Court did not accept the 
recommendation of a one year suspension and simply issued 
a reprimand. The Court rejected the suspension, in part, 
because appellant's responsibilities as Attorney General 
would be hampered by his suspension from the practice of law. 
The Court thus effectively granted appellant immunity 
and placed him above the Code for any penalty more severe than 
reprimand. This is error. It shields the Attorney General from 
discipline except reprimand, no matter how serious his mis-
conduct may be. 
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Further, the effect, if any, of a suspension from the 
practice of law on the status of appellant as Attorney General 
was not before the Court, and it was error for the court to 
consider it. 
POINT TWO 
********* 
THE CCURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE DUTY OF PROTECTING 
THE PUBLIC IN DETERMINING THE SANCTION TO APPLY TO 
APPELLANT. 
The primary purpose of the Code of Professional Conduct 
and disciplinary proceedings thereunder is to protect the 
public. The legal profession holds a public trust, and has 
been accorded the privilege of internal discipline, which the 
Bar Commission submits has not been adequately exercised in this 
case. 
The Court failed to recognize the paramount interest of 
the public in two respects. First, the Court gave undue weight 
to the education and committment devoted to the career of an 
individual attorney, thereby establishing it as a competing 
interest to be balanced against the protection of the public. 
Secondly, the Court erred in holding that an attorney's license 
to practice law should not be interfered with unless he is 
guilty of culpable wrong, dishonesty or willful misconduct. 
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Clearly, an attorney has an important property interest 
in his license to practice law and it may not be interfered 
with or revoked without due process. Nonetheless, the standard 
to be applied is noncompliance with the affirmative duties 
imposed by the Code of Professional conduct--irrespective of 
the presence of intent. The public interest would obviously 
require disbarment of an incompetent attorney despite the 
best intentions on his part. 
An attorney who is negligent may cause as much damage 
to the public as one who is dishonest. Particularly where the 
negligence is, as it was here, gross, continuing and in dis-
regard of the entreaties of clients. Simple neglect may be 
excused with a reprimand. Gross and continuous neglect warrants 
suspension or a more severe penalty. 
POINT THREE 
*********** 
THE COURT ERRED BY APPLYING AN IMPROPER STANDARD 
OF REVIEW OF THE FINDINGS AND RECCMMENDATIONS OF 
THE BAR CCMMISSION IN DISCIPLINARY MATTERS. 
In deciding this case, the Court held that the findings 
and recommendations of the Bar Commission are merely advisory 
since it is the sole responsibility of the Court to discipline 
attorneys. This holding ignores the clear weight of authority 
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contained in previous decisions of this Court wherein it 
was held that the Bar's findings and recommendations are 
presumed to be correct and proper and that they will be 
sustained unless found to be arbitrary, capricious or not 
supported by substantial evidence. In re Johnston, 524 P.2d 
593, 594; In re Badger, 493 P.2d 1273; In re Wade, 497 P.2d 
106; In re MacFarlane, 350 P.2d 631, 633; In re Fullmer, 
405 P.2d 343, 344 (Ut. 1965). 
It is undisputed that the Court has the final responsibilit 
for disciplining attorneys who have violated the Code of 
Professional Conduct. However, the Court in its former 
decisions has recognized, at least implicitly, that the Bar sha~ 
that responsibility. In MacFarlane, supra, the court noted 
that the Bar Commission is uniquely qualified to fulfill this 
role, stating: 
On this problem it is relevant to observe that the 
propriety of the questioned conduct must necessarily 
be directed to the good conscience and ethical and 
moral standards of members of the Bar, and that the 
Bar Commissioners as its elected representatives are 
peculiarly suited to be the arbiters of such stand-
ards. They are vitally concerned with the general 
conduct of the Bar and its public relations and are 
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also seriously concerned with a charge against a 
fellow member such as that involved in the instant 
proceeding. 350 P.2d at 633. 
The Court has often stated that the judge or tribunal 
hearing the evidence is in the best position to draw findings 
and conclusions therefrom. If this Court holds that the 
Commission's findings and recommendations are merely advisory, 
then it should have the benefit of more than the "cold" record 
in determining the appropriate sanctions in this case. It 
would better enable the Court to fulfill its responsibility 
to discipline attorneys if the Bar withdrew entirely from the 
disciplinary process. The Court should have the same opportun-
ity the hearing panel had to hear the testimony and observe the 
demeanor of the witnesses. 
In performing what is essentially a de novo review, the 
Court was sorely deprived in having before it only the bare 
transcript together with the briefs and abbreviated arguments 
of counsel. 
POINT FO"JR 
********** 
THE CCURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER MATERIAL 
ASPECTS OF APPELLANT'S CONDUCT IN DETERMINING 
THE SANCTION TO APPLY. 
The Bar Commission did not expressly find that appellant 
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engaged in any dishonesty or willful or intentional mis-
conduct. Nor did the Commission find that appellant's 
conduct constituted mere neglect or indiscretion. The 
majority opinion's characterization of appellant's conduct 
in these terms is unsupported by the record and ignores the 
gravamen of the findings against him. 
With respect to Counts I and II, appellant's initial 
misconduct was the result of simple negligence and inattention. 
However, once the mistakes were called to his attention by 
his clients and demands for accounting were made, his actions 
became knowing and willful. Appellant failed to make an 
accounting upon the demand of the clients and later, their 
attorneys. He did not pay over the funds until complaints 
were filed with the Bar. He refused to assemble and turn over 
his records until the eve of the hearing before the Bar 
Commissioners. 
In all of this, appellant knowingly and willfully put 
his own interests before those of his clients. Appellant in-
sisted on operating a part-time law practice in addition to 
his full-time job of Deputy Attorney General. In doing so, he 
attempted to maximize his income at the expense of his clients, 
Lowry and Emarine, and then sought to justify his misconduct 
with the excuse that he was too busy or his records were too 
disorganized. 
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Some time after appellant became aware of his clients' 
demands for accountin~s and disbursements, he decided to run 
for elective office. During his campaign, he continued to 
refuse to account to his clients or their attorneys. The 
import of the Code of Professional Conduct is that an attorney 
may not put his own interests ahead of the'client's when there 
is a conflict. Appellant, by his conduct, forced his clients 
to take a back seat to his political ambitions. 
Thus, what may have begun as neglect on appellant's part 
took on a knowing and more serious character over the following 
years due to his foot-dragging. His refusal to pay over moneys 
to Mrs. Emarine until she produced cancelled checks from the 
effects of her dead ex-husband, in order to prove they did not 
bounce, is totally unjustifiable. Appellant was in a far 
better position to know whether the checks cleared since he 
deposited them. Instead of accounting to Mrs. Emarine, he 
forced her to prove to him that he owed her the money. 
As of the date of the hearing, Mrs. Lowry still had 
not been provided an accounting. Her rights for additional 
recovery have been totally foreclosed since the original 
judgment debtor is dead. 
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With respect to Count III, the majority opinion character-
ized the remarks of appellant as an "indiscretion". However, 
the court did not consider the fact that the statement was 
made during a controversial trial in the midst of appellant's 
political campaign. There was no reason for appellant to 
talk to the reporter in the first place--as a responsible 
prosecutor, he should have declined comment. His conduct 
cannot be construed as an inadvertent slip of the tongue in 
the performance of his duties. When appellant encouraged 
publicity, he was obligated to see to it that he did not make 
statements which encroached on society's interest in maintain-
ing free and fair trials. 
The central theme running through the findings of the Bar 
Commission and the supporting evidence is that appellant com-
pounded his initial mistakes by constantly placing his own 
interests--political and economic--ahead of those of his 
clients and the public at-large. This is contrary to the 
lawyer's role which is to serve his clients and the interests 
of justice. The public trust, of which this Court is the 
bulwark, demands protection from appellant's conduct. 
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CONCLUSION 
********** 
The recommendation of the Bar was supported by the 
evidence. As has been pointed out in the responding brief of 
the Bar Commission on appeal, the record reflects substantial 
evidence of gross and continuing violations of the code of 
such a nature to warrant suspension. The Bar Commission 
carefully considered the matter, exercised restraint, and 
certainly did not act arbitrarily nor unreasonably. 
Holding suspension is not warranted, ignores the sub-
stantiated weight of the evidence and constitutes err•r. 
DATED this 51 dai111;;;~.< 
VAR E. STARK' 
Attorney 
2651 Washington Boulevard 
Suite o. 10 
O;Jde , Utah 84401 
BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
818 26th Street 
o:Jden, Utah 84401 
Attorneys for Utah State Bar Commission 
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